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Why did Lehman Brothers have to go bankrupt?  This question has often been 
asked since the bankruptcy of Lehman was recognized as having a hugely 
disruptive effect on the financial system and the economy around the world 
beyond expectations.  For that question, a broad range of materials have 
provided various answers from each viewpoint.  FCIC’s report indicates that 
risky trading activities, enormous leverage, reliance on short-term funding, 
problems in its corporate governance including risk management as well as 
inadequate regulatory oversight can be significant causes of Lehman’s collapse.  
However, why could such common weaknesses not be easily corrected or improved 
but be overlooked for a long time, and lead to such a huge calamity?  A more 
in-depth investigation or a study from a different viewpoint may be required to 
grasp the essence of this problem and to find the right way and direction of 
regulatory reforms.  In this essay, from the case studies of Bear Sterns, Lehman 
Brothers, and AIG, some of the essential weaknesses in their risk management 
and in the Federal Reserve’s supervision especially over their liquidity risk are 
pointed out.  Then, by comparing with the framework and conduct of the BOJ’s 
monitoring of financial institutions’ liquidity, the reasons why the Federal 
Reserve could not sufficiently exert its regulatory and supervisory power over 
those financial institutions’ liquidity risk management will be examined.  Finally, 
based on the analysis above, some assessment of Dodd-Frank regulatory reforms 





Why did Lehman Brothers have to go bankrupt?   
This question has been often asked since the bankruptcy of Lehman was 
recognized as having a hugely disruptive effect on the financial system and the 
economy around the world beyond expectations.  For that question, a broad 
range of materials ── from an investigative report like “The Financial Crisis 
Inquiry Report (FCIC),” 1 or “Report of Anton R. Valukas, Examiner” 2 to a 
documentary movie like “Inside Job”3 or a private diary like “On the Brink”4
In the following, from the case studies of Bear Sterns, Lehman Brothers, 
and AIG, some of the essential weaknesses in their risk management and in the 
Federal Reserve’s supervision especially over their liquidity risk are pointed out.  
Then, by comparing with the framework and conduct of the BOJ’s monitoring of 
financial institutions’ liquidity, the reasons why the Federal Reserve could not 
sufficiently exert its regulatory and supervisory power over those financial 
institutions’ liquidity risk management will be examined.  Finally, based on the 
analysis above, some assessment of Dodd-Frank regulatory reforms will be added. 
,── 
have provided various answers from each viewpoint.  For example, FCIC’s report 
indicates that risky trading activities, enormous leverage, reliance on short-term 
funding, problems in its corporate governance including risk management as well 
as inadequate regulatory oversight can be significant causes of Lehman’s collapse.  
However, those weaknesses or problems are not out of the ordinary at all, but the 
extremely general risk-factors which financial institutions, vulnerable even to a 
small liquidity shock, tend to hold.  Why such common weaknesses could not be 
easily corrected or improved but be overlooked for a long time, and led to such a 
huge calamity?  A more in-depth investigation or a study from a different 
viewpoint may be required to grasp the essence of this problem and to find the 
right way and direction of regulatory reforms. 
 
2. Bear Sterns, Lehman Brothers, and AIG 
Regarding the causes of those three institutions’ failures, the FCIC’s 
conclusions are as follows: 
                                                   
1 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, “The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, Authorized Edition: Final Report of the 
National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States” January 2011 
2 United States Bankruptcy Court Southern District of New York, In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., et al., Debtors, 
Chapter 11 Case No. 08-13555 (JMP), “Report of Anton R. Valukas, Examiner” March 11, 2010 
3 Sony Pictures Classics, “Inside Job” directed by Charles Ferguson, 2010 




Exposure to risky mortgage assets 
  Reliance on short-term funding 
  High leverage 
  Weak corporate governance and risk management 
Inadequate supervision by SEC 
(Lehman Brothers) 
  Inadequate regulatory oversight 
  Risky trading activities (massive derivatives positions) 
Enormous leverage 
Reliance on short-term funding 
Significant problems in corporate governance including risk management 
(AIG) 
  Enormous sale of CDS without putting up initial collateral, setting aside capital 
reserves, or hedging its exposure 
  Profound failures in corporate governance, particularly its risk management practices 
  Sweeping deregulation of OTC derivatives  
  The OTS’s failure to effectively exercise its authority over AIG and its affiliates 
 
The fault common to those institutions, if any, can be a lack of the 
diversification, which is one of the most important fundamentals of risk 
management, of their investments and funding, in terms of financial products, 
maturities, or counterparties.  Especially in case of Bear Sterns and Lehman 
Brothers, they could be too much exposed to subprime mortgage CDOs on their 
asset side and to overnight tri-party repos on their liability side.  At least, 
“regional diversification within the mortgage market was illusion.”5
 
  As a result, 
these 2 least diversified institutions among large financial institutions “ran into 
trouble first.”  
3. The Federal Reserve’s supervision 
(1) Macro-prudential viewpoint 
Their excessive exposure to CDOs has two important implications in 
terms of the investment banks’ business model.  First, their business model has 
been dramatically changed.  Investment banks’ business had been basically 
“advising and conducting fee-oriented transactions for clients,”6
                                                   
5 These quotations in this paragraph are adduce from Professor Jacques Rolfo’s lecture notes of “Credit Risk and Financial 
Regulation,” Columbia Business School, Spring, 2011 
 but recently they 
6 These quotations in this paragraph are adduced from Chaplinsky, Susan “Bear Sterns and the Seeds of its Demise” 
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have invested “their own and shareholders’ funds in securities,” and earned their 
profits mainly from “these investments and their proprietary trading.”  Second, 
investment in mortgage CDOs can result in weaker risk management, in 
comparison with making mortgage loans.  One of the most significant problems 
of securitization is that “transfer of credit risk distanced the borrowers from the 
lenders.”  “The banks’ incentive to carefully approve loan applications, to 
monitor and to collect the loans is weakened considerably because a substantial 
portion of credit risk is soon passed on to other financial institutions.”  Therefore, 
too much exposure to CDOs can lead “to an erosion of lending standards and to 
excesses in lending.” 
Actually, on the vulnerable assumption that the housing prices continue 
to rise, huge capital flew continuously into the mortgage CDOs whose risks those 
institutions ultimately took on.  That means that huge risks were accumulated 
in the mortgage CDO market and some problem in that market could cause 
serious damage not only to the assets of individual financial institutions, but also 
to the financial system as a whole through the complicated interconnectedness of 
financial institutions with each other.  If such a sense of crisis had been broadly 
shared among the market participants, including supervisory and regulatory 
authorities, at the earlier stage, the risks accumulated in the market would have 
been minimized or, at least, reduced earlier.  In that sense, it is very important, 
in order to prevent financial crises, for the supervisory authorities to have 
effective measures to give an early warning of the risks accumulated in the 
financial system, from a macro-prudential viewpoint, and to share such a prudent 
perception with individual financial institutions. 
 
(2) Lender of last resort 
On the other hands, FCIC (2011) also pointed out that “the inconsistency 
of federal government decisions in not rescuing Lehman after having rescued 
Bear Sterns and GSEs, and immediately before rescuing AIG, added to 
uncertainty and panic in the financial markets.”  Why the Federal Reserve could 
not act as a lender of last resort in Lehman’s case?  Or why didn’t Fed Chairman 
Bernanke buy Lehman’s “ketchup” in order to prevent this catastrophe although, 
by section 13 (3) of the Federal Reserve Act, the Board of Governors of the Federal 
Reserve System may authorize any Federal reserve bank to make secured loans 
                                                                                                                                                              




to any individual or corporation in unusual and exigent circumstances when the 
borrower is unable to secure adequate credit accommodations from other banking 
institutions? 
Regarding this criticism, Fed Chairman Bernanke made a 
counterargument that the Federal Reserve did not have legal authority to rescue 
Lehman and that Lehman did not have sufficient collateral to secure a loan from 
the Federal Reserve under section 13 (3) of the Federal Reserve Act.  However, 
as Federal reserve General Counsel Scott Alvarez mentioned, requiring loans 
under 13 (3) to be fully secured could “undermine the very purpose of 13 (3), 
which was to make credit available in unusual and exigent circumstances to help 
restore economic activity.” 
In contrast, to deal with the consequences of the bursting of the asset 
bubble in 1990s and to ensure the stability of the financial system and of the 
economy, the Bank of Japan took boldly several unconventional measures.  As 
Shirakawa (2011)7
In the autumn of 1997, massive off-balance-sheet liabilities were suddenly 
revealed at Yamaichi Securities, one of the biggest securities companies in Japan at 
the time, and it was decided to liquidate the company.  However, the company had 
bank subsidiaries in Europe, and at that time, other Japanese financial institutions held 
a large amount of impaired assets.  Thus, it was judged that an immediate legal 
liquidation would very likely pose a systemic risk.  The bank of Japan, therefore, 
decided to provide Yamaichi with an unlimited amount of liquidity to support the orderly 
closure of its business operations.
 pointed out, one of the important measures “is the provision of 
loans as a lender of last resort to a security company whose solvency could not be 
judged clearly.” 
8
Regrettably, at Yamaichi’s subsequent legal bankruptcy proceedings, it was 
determined in 2005 that a part of the loans by the Bank of Japan to Yamaichi was 
unrecoverable.  However, it should be noted that a situation like the one after the 
failure of Lehman Brothers, when real quarterly GDP contracted at a double-digit rate 
on a year-to-year basis, was avoided. 
 
The FCIC (2011) also criticizes the Federal Reserve for not furnishing “to 
                                                   
7 Shirakawa, Masaaki, “150 Years of Innovation and Challenges in Monetary Control,” Speech at Goethe-Universitaet 
Frankfurt am Main in Celebration of the 150th Anniversary of German-Japanese Diplomatic Relations, March 8, 2011 
8 The Bank has made its view clear in applying the following four principle on providing such special loans: 
Principle 1: There must be a strong likelihood that systemic risk will manifest itself. 
Principle 2: There must be no alternative to the provision of central bank money. 
Principle 3: All relevant parties are required to take clear responsibility to avoid a moral hazard. 
Principle 4: The financial soundness of the Bank itself must not be impaired.  
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the FCIC any written analysis to illustrate that Lehman lacked sufficient 
collateral to secure a loan under 13 (3).”  In March 2008, the Federal Reserve 
had already provided a loan under 13 (3) for Bear Sterns and bought its 
non-performing assets to facilitate JP Morgan’s purchase of Bear (so-called 
“Maiden Lane”).  A logical conclusion to which those arguments above can lead is 
that the Federal Reserve could not accurately grasp the details, including the 
values, of Lehman’s assets and liabilities, and Lehman’s interconnections with 
other financial institutions, or that the Federal Reserve could underestimate the 
impact of Lehman’s bankruptcy.  In his other speech 9
In the United States, in ordinary circumstances only depository institutions have 
direct access to the discount window, and open market operations are conducted with 
just a small set of primary dealers against a narrow range of highly liquid collateral.  In 
contrast, in jurisdictions with universal banking, the distinction between depository 
institutions and other types of financial institutions is much less relevant in defining 
access to central bank liquidity than is the case in the United States.  Moreover, some 
central banks have greater flexibility than the Federal Reserve in the types of collateral 
they can accept in open market operations.  As a result, some foreign central banks 
have been able to address the recent liquidity pressures within their existing measures.  
In contrast, the Federal Reserve has had to use methods it does not usually employ to 
address liquidity pressures across a number of markets and institutions.  In effect, the 
Federal Reserve has had to innovate in large part to achieve what other central banks 
have been able to effect through existing tools. 
, Chairman Bernanke 
remarked the following: 
The efficacy of the discount window has been limited by the reluctance of 
depository institutions to use the window as a source of funding.  The “stigma” 
associated with the discount window, which if anything intensifies during periods of 
crisis, arises primarily from banks’ concerns that market participants will draw adverse 
inferences about their financial condition if their borrowing from the Federal Reserve 
were to become known. 
As Thornton (2009) 10
                                                   
9 Bernanke, Ben S. “Liquidity Provision by the Federal Reserve.” Presented at the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta 
Financial Market Conference, Sea Island, Georgia, May 13, 2008 
 indicated, the Federal Reserve might not be 
confident that it could allocate credit to the financial institutions most in need of 
liquidity by using traditional tools.  In other words, “while well-established 
mechanisms existed for injecting reserves into a country’s financial system, 
official had no way to guarantee that the reserves will reach the banks that need 




them.”11  On the other hands, “the Federal Reserve Act does not prevent the Fed 
from purchasing asset-backed securities, commercial paper, and a wide range of 
other securities, such as those taken as collateral against loans under the new 
lending programs.  Nor does the Act prevent the Fed from engaging in open 
market operations with institutions with other than primary security dealers.”12
 
  
From those statements and analyses, it may be said that the bottom line is that 
the Federal Reserve’s improvement in its measures of the supervision of financial 
institutions, including introduction of fine-tuned measures to provide sufficient 
liquidity for the financial institutions most in need, was one step behind. 
(3) Liquidity monitoring and guidance 
Thus, both before and after the financial crisis, the Federal Reserve’s 
supervision of financial institutions and its functions to maintaining of the 
financial system stability might not be carried out sufficiently.  Moreover, Report 
of Anton R. Valukas (2010) may also indicate that the Federal Reserve’s daily 
liquidity monitoring failed to function properly.  According to the Report, “in 
regulatory filings and disclosure to the public, Lehman represented that it 
maintained a liquidity pool primarily intended to cover expected cash outflows”, 
including “automatic collateral pledges to derivatives counterparties” “triggered 
in the events that Lehman suffered a ratings downgrades”, “for twelve months in 
a stressed liquidity environment.”  Certainly, it is very important especially for 
investment banks, which have no stable funding source like deposits, to hold a 
sufficient liquidity pool as one of effective measures against an unpredictable 
liquidity shortage.  In order to maintain the financial system stability, however, 
it is more important that the supervisory and regulatory authorities verify 
precisely whether or not the assets in the liquidity pool can really be monetized at 
short notice in all market circumstances, and that when they find some problem 
or something suspicious in the liquidity pool disclosed to the public, they direct 
the financial institution to correct it.  
In fact, “certain assets Lehman deposited with or pledged to its clearing 
banks were counted in Lehman’s liquidity pool.”  Since the summer 2008, 
Lehman had included such encumbered assets in its liquidity pool “despite the 
fact that the collateral was subject to a security interest, was returnable to 
Lehman only on three days’ notice and was placed to ensure that” its clearing 
                                                   
11 Cecchetti, Stephan G. “Crisis and Responses: The Federal Reserve and the Financial Crisis of 2007-2008.” NBER 
Working paper No. 14134, National Bureau of Economic Research, June 2008 
12 Thornton (2009) 
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banks would continue their clearing operations.  The serious problem is that 
although “the FRBNY knew that Lehman included pledged assets in its liquidity 
pool, as Lehman’s lender rather than regulator, the FRBNY took no step to 
compel Lehman to disclose the discrepancy between Lehman’s reported liquidity 
pool and the actual, smaller number.”13
What is astonishing most is the fact that the Federal Reserve took no step 
because it was not Lehman’s primary regulator but its lender “although liquidity 
─the immediate ability to assess funds─ is the life’s blood of an investment 
bank”, in other words, although “liquidity is more important than capital; most 
entities which go bankrupt do so because they run out of financing, not because 
the value of their assets falls below the value of their liabilities.”  However, as 
written in a general textbook on finance or banking, the essential function which 
a lender must carry out is monitoring prudently of the financial and liquidity 
situation of the borrower and encouraging it to improve the situation when 
necessary.  And many of the functions of a supervisor are closely related to those 
of a lender.  Also regarding the daily monitoring of Lehman’s liquidity, it cannot 




4. The Bank of Japan’s supervision 
In contrast, it may be said that the financial institutions in Japan, as a 
whole, could avoid a serious liquidity crisis, and the financial system of Japan 
could be relatively stable.  What caused this significant difference between the 
financial system of the United States and that of Japan?   
To be exact, unlike the Federal Reserve, the BOJ doesn’t have regulatory 
authority.  Therefore, the Bank must have continued to devise effective 
supervisory (not regulatory) means of contributing to the maintenance of stability 
of the financial system, which is described as one of the missions imposed to the 
Bank in the BOJ Act.  In fact, since the Japan’s financial crisis in 1997, the Bank 
has improved its supervisory measures to provide efficiently necessary and 
sufficient liquidity, while avoiding a moral hazard, for the financial system and to 
communicate the Bank’s views on the risks which lie hidden in the financial 
system with the markets participants.  Among them, two different kinds of 
measures can be considered as the effective ones which played an important role 
in ensuring Japan’s financial system stability in 2008. 
                                                   
13 Moreover, “Lehman’s primary regulator, the SEC, was unaware of the extent to which Lehman was including 




(1) Complementary lending facility 
One is the provision of complementary lending through a Lombard-style 
standing facility 14 , which “complements a framework for monetary control 
through market operations as well as equipped with a function to prepare for an 
unexpected fund shortage, thereby contributes to ensuring the stability and 
maintenance of smooth functioning of financial markets.”15
Regarding such a standing facility like the discount window, both the 
stigma problem
  The complementary 
lending facility has “nurtured a sense of security for future funding” as its 
essential function, and it actually has been widely used in the crisis, in other 




 and moral hazard problem in liquidity risk management 
should be also recognized.  However, the BOJ, “to facilitate the use of the 
measure while avoiding the stigma, has been extremely careful in that, for 
example, not disclosing the name of financial institutions that used it.”  On the 
other hand, as a countermeasure against moral hazard problem, the Bank has 
“included ‘appropriateness of liquidity risk management’ as an eligibility 
requirement for becoming a counterparty of the complementary lending facility.”  
Therefore, against the financial institutions which constantly and excessively 
depend on the complementary lending facility, the Bank needs to take necessary 
steps to make them improve their liquidity risk situation and management 
system including securing alternative efficient funding sources.  The important 
point is that this measure is not provided in order for the Bank to bail out 
individual financial institutions which are suffering from liquidity shortage, but 
to maintain the stability of the financial system. 
(2) Financial System Report 
The other is the regular publication of the Financial System Report, 
which “analyzes and assesses the risks and their magnitude in Japan’s financial 
system”, “presents a comprehensive evaluation,” and “facilitates communication 
                                                   
14 By this facility, financial institutions can request to use whenever necessary within the amount of collateral that have 
been submitted. 
15These quotations in this paragraph and in the next paragraph are adduced from Bank of Japan, “Liquidity Risk 
Management in Financial Institutions Following the Global Financial Crisis” July 2, 2010  
16 In general, financial institutions have a feeling of resistance to using the measure for fear of damaging their reputations 
by the actual use becoming clear. 
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with concerned parties in order to contribute to securing the stability.”17  The 
Financial System Report, which the Federal Reserve does not draw up unlike 
other central banks, also contributes to assessing, from a macro-prudential 
perspective, the current state of Japan’s financial system and the location of risks 
“by taking account of the interconnectedness of economic activities, financial 
markets and the behavior of financial institutions, and to taking conscious steps 
to base institutional design and policy responses on such assessments.”18
In fact, the Bank had already pointed out in the Report 2006 that “banks 
have increased investing in alternative financial products, such as structured 




In view of the fact that the United States has experienced financial crises 
or panics repeatedly in its history, it seems to be necessary that the regulatory 
and supervisory authorities in the United States also devise the effective 
measures to give an early warning of the risks accumulated in the financial 
system as a whole, from a macro-prudential viewpoint, and to share such a 
prudential perception with individual financial institutions.  Actually, as 
Shirakawa (2009) indicated, “the recent financial crisis may have reached a 
global scale and involved new financial products and players, but essentially it is 
a classic example of the rise and collapse of an economic bubble.”  And, in 
retrospect, it is observed that before the previous crises and panics in the United 
States, money stock or stock price almost necessarily had grown at much higher 
rate than real economy continuously (Table(1)).  As such a simple observation 
indicates, before the bursting of a bubble, or in the midst of a bubble, something a 
  And, at the same time, it had warned financial institutions that 
“banks need to carefully monitor the nature and extent of the risks associated 
with investments in alternative financial products” not only because “the risk and 
return profiles of these products are not easy to quantify due to the complexity of 
their design and the limited availability of information required for the 
qualification of risk,” but because “it is often difficult to liquidate investments in 
alternative products in a timely fashion.”  Such efforts by the BOJ to share the 
Bank’s view about the risks in the financial system with financial institutions, 
combined with on-site examinations, off-site monitoring, and fine-tuned 
measures to provide necessary and sufficient liquidity, have proved effective in 
the financial crisis of 2008. 
                                                   
17 These quotations are adduced from Bank of Japan, “Financial System Report” September 28, 2010 
18 This quotation is adduced from Shirakawa, Masaaki, “Macroprudence and the Central Bank” Speech at the Seminar of 
the Securities Analysts Association of Japan Tokyo, December 22, 2009 
19 These quotations in this paragraph are adduced from Bank of Japan, “Financial System Report” July 20, 2006 
11 
 
little abnormal happens and often continues: Isn’t the gap between the growth 
rate of stock price and that of long-term real GDP abnormally and continuously 
huge?  Is it normal that 30-year swap spread continues to be negative or that 
10-year swap spread continues to be quite small?  Is Facebook really a firm 
worth of 50 billion dollars?20
 
 
















M21) 6.00  8.18  14.62  4.87  6.78  5.70  
Dow Jones 2) n.a. 16.42 20.07 38.14 8.39 11.25 
Long-term 
real GDP 
2.993)  3.064)  
 
Source: Historical Statistics of the United States Millennial Edition Online 
(Cambridge University Press), Federal Reserve Statistical Release and 
Historical Data (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System) 
 1) Average annual growth rates of five years just before each event 
 2) Industrial.  Average annual growth rates of two years just before each event 
3) Average annual growth rate of 50 years before Great Depression (1880-1930) 
 4) Average annual growth rate after WWⅡ(1945-2002) 
 
(3) Fine-tuned daily liquidity monitoring, advice and guidance 
Moreover, in order to ensure sufficient functioning of those supervisory 
measures argued above, flexible and fine-tuned daily liquidity monitoring, advice, 
and guidance by the Bank is needed.  That is the foundation of the Bank’s 
supervision, and regarding its importance, the Bank of Japan (2010)21
One of the important lessons from the experience of the financial turmoil since 
2007 on the financial institutions’ risk management is that the foundation of financial 
institution management could be threatened by liquidity crunch, even though the 
financial institution had a solid capital base.  Appropriate liquidity risk management is 
vital both for achieving sound management of financial institutions and for maintaining 
 observed 
the following: 
                                                   
20 In this connection, the BOJ has indicated, in its Financial System Report 2010, three risks of the present Japan’s 
financial system; accumulated credit risk associated with small and medium-sized firms and mortgage, accumulating 
interest rate risk associated with government bond investment, and remaining market risk associated with stockholding. 




financial system stability.  In highly globalized financial markets, liquidity risk could 
immediately spread once it manifests itself and might induce a global liquidity crisis.  
Financial institutions need to strive constantly to improve liquidity risk management.  
The BOJ also needs to encourage financial institutions to steadily pursue such efforts in 
order to preempt a future financial crisis. 
The Bank monitors financial institutions’ funding and investment policies, 
financial data, and liquidity positions22 largely in the off-site monitoring section 
and it grasps and verifies the internal control mechanism and the preparation of 
contingency plans mainly through the on-site examination.  In the off-site 
monitoring section, persons in charge monitor liquidity position on a daily basis 
and exchange opinions regularly, which is a major characteristic of the BOJ’s 
liquidity monitoring.  The concrete methods of the Bank’s liquidity monitoring 
can be summarized as a process of (1) taking into account the factors such as 
versatility of financial institutions’ businesses and changing market conditions, 
and (2) from a viewpoint of looking through each financial institution’s fund 
availability in the future, (3) judge the liquidity risk situation in a comprehensive 
manner based on a broad range of information obtained through monitoring, and 
provide fine-tuned advice and guidance, when necessary, through a daily dialogue 
with financial institutions.  And in the recent financial crisis, such monitoring 
was strengthened through expanding the contents and increasing the frequency 
of information collected from financial institutions, and by thoroughly 
encouraging stable daily funding.23
 
 
(4) Culture and values 
Through such flexible and fine-tuned daily liquidity monitoring, advice, 
and guidance, the Bank not only encourages financial institutions to improve 
their liquidity risk management, but also shares with them the view that 
financial institutions, together with the central bank, take on the responsibility of 
ensuring smooth settlement of funds among financial institutions.  Smooth 
settlement of funds is not only the most fundamental condition for the financial 
system stability, but one of the most important social infrastructures, like 
                                                   
22 The Bank monitors changes in each financial institution’s assets and liabilities including off-balance items and gauges a 
mismatch between the maturity of assets and liabilities and the degree of leverages.  The Bank also obtains various 
information on daily finance operations, including products, types, terms, amounts, and rates (and, in some cases, 
counterparties) of investment and fund-raising, from each financial institution and examines, for example, whether or not 
the dependence on funding from the market is adequate for its funding ability, or whether or not there are problems in 
managing collateral.   
23 The explanation in this paragraph as to the Bank’s liquidity monitoring is based on Bank of Japan “The Bank of Japan’s 
Approach to Liquidity Risk Management in Financial Institutions” June 26, 2009 and Bank of Japan (2010). 
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electricity, waterworks, and roads, which contribute to efficient and smooth 
economic activities.  Once only a component of the infrastructure (each financial 
institution) falls into malfunction, the whole infrastructure (the financial or 
settlement system as a whole) can malfunction through the network effect (in 
other words, through the complicated interconnectedness with each other 
component), and the whole economy can be seriously damaged.  Because of such 
a huge external effect, each component of the infrastructure, namely each 
financial institution, is always required to function soundly and to be highly 
disciplined.  And only after they can fulfill such requirements, they can directly 
access the central bank money. 
The BOJ includes “appropriateness of liquidity risk management” as an 
eligibility requirement for becoming a counterparty of the Bank’s complementary 
lending and open market operations24, and publishes the checklist for liquidity 
management, based on which the Bank checks financial institutions’ liquidity 
risk management system in order to strengthen the stability of Japan’s financial 
system.  These measures, in one view, can be also considered to play a significant 
role in planting firmly in financial institutions’ culture the normative view that 
they have to take on the quasi-public responsibility as an important component of 
the social infrastructure.  That may be one of the interesting characteristics of 
Japanese financial institutions25
 
 which can be justified in accessing directly the 
central bank money. 
 
5. Institutional difference between the US and Japan 
Why the BOJ has continued and must have continued to devise and 
improve its supervisory measures intensively?  One of the possible reasons can 
be the subtle difference of its position from that of the Federal Reserve as an 
authority which has responsibility for the maintenance of the financial system 
stability. 
In “The Federal Reserve System: Purposes and Functions,” (bank) 
regulation is defined as “actions to make and issue rules and regulations and 
enforce those rules and other laws governing the structure and conduct of 
banking,” and on the other hand, it defines (bank) supervision as “oversight of 
individual banks to ensure that they are operated prudently and in accordance 
                                                   
24 When financial institutions are judged not to meet the requirements, the Bank can take measures such as canceling the 
approval at the time of approval renewal, regular selection, or on an ad-hoc basis. 
25 It may be a typical example of that kind of culture of Japanese financial institutions that the President of Mizuho Bank 
is reported to resign to take responsibility for its system malfunction. 
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with applicable statutes and regulations.”  According to these definitions, the 
Federal Reserve can be considered to have regulatory and supervisory authority 
over financial institutions.  On the other hand, it may be inaccurate that the 
Bank of Japan has regulatory authority over, and regulatory responsibilities even 
for, banking institutions. 
The BOJ conducts the monitoring and examining of financial institutions, 
but does not have authority to make and to issue rules and regulations.  In other 
words, bank regulation is the duty of the Financial Service Agency in Japan.  For 
example, the BOJ can carry out its on-site examination of financial institutions, 
and the Bank does it not because the on-site examination by the BOJ is legally 
enforceable, but because the Bank may conclude a contract concerning the on-site 
examination, with the financial institutions that would be the counterparty in the 
Bank’s business, in other words, would like to open their current account at the 
Bank.   
Another difference is to what extent each central bank has to be legally 
and clearly responsible for the stability of the financial system.  Bank of Japan 
Act clearly describes the purposes of the Bank. 
 
Article 1 (Purpose) 
(1) The purpose of the Bank of Japan, or the central bank of Japan, is to issue 
banknotes and to carry out currency and monetary control. 
(2) In addition to what is prescribed in the preceding paragraph, the Bank of 
Japan's purpose is to ensure smooth settlement of funds among banks and other 
financial institutions, thereby contributing to the maintenance of stability of the 
financial system. 
 
On the other hand, such a clear description of the financial system 
stability as one of the purposes of the Federal Reserve cannot be found in Federal 
Reserve Act although the Federal Reserve has the “lender of last resort” function 
and is, of course, expected to have the same responsibility for systemic risk 
containment as the BOJ.  These differences or the cultural and historical 
backgrounds that are underlying causes of those differences seem to characterize 
the practical approaches of each central bank to the supervision of financial 
institution, especially its off-site liquidity monitoring, and to the maintenance of 
stability of the financial system. 
Unlike the BOJ which must maintain the financial system stability under 
the restrictions that it is not given regulatory authority, in other words, that it 
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has only supervisory authority and its main measure is limited to the off-site 
liquidity monitoring, advice and guidance, the Federal Reserve has supervisory 
and strong regulatory authority over some segments of the banking industry, but 
not over all financial institutions.  In terms of the measures to improve the 
liquidity risk management of financial institutions and to maintain the financial 
system stability, excessive dependence on the regulations and rules can weaken 
its approach in off-site liquidity monitoring to the improvement of financial 
institutions’ risk management because regulations and rules seem to be stronger 
and easier (but, maybe less effective) measures than monitoring, advice and 
guidance in off-site supervision, in general.  However, easy way is not 
necessarily the best way. 
Conversely, the Federal Reserve’s approaches as a “lender of last resort” 
to the problems, especially the problems of liquidity risk management, of the 
financial institutions which are outside its responsibility can be insufficient 
although those institutions are the major participants of financial markets and 
the major components of the financial system.  In other words, although the 
Federal Reserve, not as a regulator but as a (potential) lender, needed, from the 
viewpoint of financial system stability, to encourage such financial institutions to 
improve their risk management, it might not really put its back into dealing with 
that problem only because it was not the primary regulator of the large 
investment banks like Lehman Brothers.  That can be one of the major causes of 
mounting liquidity risk in the financial system. 
 
 
6. Concluding remarks 
Based on the arguments above, the important measures to maintain the 
financial system stability can be classified as Table (2).  Instead of Financial 
System (or Stability) Report by the Federal Reserve, the Office of Financial 
Research will be established by the Dodd-Frank Act that is in charge of the 
research and analysis of the financial system as a whole and is expected to 
support of the activities of the Financial Stability Oversight Council (FSOC).  
The FSOC is also created by Dodd-Frank Act, whose purposes are the following26
1) Identify risks to the financial stability that could arise from material 
financial distress or failure or ongoing activities of large, interconnected bank 
holding companies or nonbank financial companies 
: 
                                                   
26 The following description about its purpose is quoted from the lecture notes of Professor Philip R. Giles, “Banking and 
the Money Markets” Columbia Business School, Autumn 2010 
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2) To promote market discipline by eliminating expectations on the part of 
shareholders, creditors and counterparties of such companies that the 
government will shield them from losses in the event of failure 
3) To respond to emerging threats to the stability of the financial system 
Establishing such organizations can be recognized as a certain progress in 
the sense that what was definitely lacking to ensure the stability of the financial 
system will be finally fulfilled. 
 
Table (2) Classification of the measures to stabilize the financial system 
 







Off-site monitoring, advice and 
guidance 
Lender of last resort 
Financial System (or Stability) 
Report 




BaselⅢ capital adequacy and 
liquidity standards 
Prompt corrective action 
Countercyclical capital buffer? 
Volcker Rule? 
 
On the other hands, regarding some regulatory measures created by 
Dodd-Frank Act, including regulation of over-the-counter swaps markets and 
Volcker Rule27, Alan Greenspan, the former chairman of the Federal Reserve, has 
warned that they could create the largest regulatory-induced market distortion in 
the US28
But, as far as the current supervisory functioning is premised, “returning 
to the half-century-ago banking practices” may have to be accepted to ensure the 
stability of the financial system and of the economy.  Actually, John Liechty, a 
professor of marketing and statistics at Pennsylvania State University, who 
helped create the Office of Financial Research, first got the idea when he met 
.  He has also criticized that “the financial system on which Dodd-Frank 
is being imposed is more complex than lawmakers, and even most regulators, 
apparently contemplate”, observing that returning “to the simpler banking 
practices of a half century ago” may not be possible if we wish to maintain today’s 
levels of productivity and standards of living.” 
                                                   
27 This rule prohibits a bank or institution that owns a bank from engaging in propriety trading that isn't at the behest of 
its clients, and from owning or investing in a hedge fund or private equity fund, as well as limiting the liabilities that the 
largest banks could hold. 
28 Greenspan, Alan, “How Dodd-Frank fails to meet the test of our times” Financial Times, March 29, 2011 
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regulators at a workshop after the crisis because he realized that regulators 
surprisingly had a completely lack of real information about how markets work, 
the size of positions and exposures among institutions.29
Another important factor for ensuring the stability of the financial system 
may be requiring each financial institution to have a stronger sense of 
responsibility as an important component of the social infrastructure.  What is 
worthy of attention as to this point is that some business schools intend to place 
greater emphasis on ethics or balance in their curriculum.  For example, in 
Columbia Business School, the main topic of the last lecture of “International 
Banking” course was “ethics, return, and balance
  Volcker Rule and lower 
standards of living may be the social cost necessary for the US.  Conversely, in 
order to ensure the stability of the financial system on the long-term basis, the 
introduction of strong regulatory measures like Volcker Rule or BaselⅢ capital 
adequacy and liquidity standards alone is not sufficient and the continuous 
improvement in the supervisory function is also necessary. 
30,” and Harvard Business 
School was reported to be adding new required courses with an increased focus on 
ethics and teamwork in its MBA program31
                                                   
29 Van Duyn, Aline, “Understand the financial system first, then regulate it” Financial Times, April 2/3, 2011 
.  These attempts may be most 
meaningful from a long-term viewpoint.  
30 From Professor Robert E. Fallon’s lecture notes of “International Banking, Value and Risk” Columbia Business School, 
Fall 2010 
31 Middleton, Diana and Light, Joe, “Harvard Changes Course” Wall Street Journal, February 3, 2011 
